The European Union Safety Agency (EASA) has proposed a raft of amended rules for drone operators, manufacturers and Member States “with a view to enhancing the security of UAS operations, in response to the European Commission’s Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security of 11 February 2026,” said the agency in a draft opinion.
The proposals will amend Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945.
“The proposed amendments shall require Member States to verify the identity of UAS operators before registration, lower the mass threshold for mandatory registration and direct remote identification from 250 g to 100 g, and clarify the framework for UAS geographical zones by introducing national conditions to improve the accessibility and consistency of information on UAS operations across the EU,” says EASA.
Protection against the illegal, negligent or malicious use of UAS needs to be strengthened, says EASA in its proposals. “The current framework already requires the registration of UAS operators and, in certain cases, the carriage of direct remote identification by drones. However, these requirements do not apply in all cases. Effective enforcement depends on the accuracy of the registration data, the ability to identify the UAS operator, and the availability of technical means to prevent the use of UAS that cannot be linked to a valid UAS operator registration number,” continued the agency.
In more detail, the proposals include:
- Leading EASA to retain the discretionary character of Article 15(1), expressed by the use of ‘may’, while introducing, where necessary, a risk-assessment requirement as a safeguard for the categories of risk to which that provision applies; limit the requirement to conduct such a risk assessment to cases involving safety, the protection of the privacy of personal data or the environment; remove the standalone concept of ‘critical infrastructure’, relying instead on the general UAS geographical zone mechanism; discontinue the proposed extension of the geo-awareness requirement; and adjust the wording of the alleviation for model aircraft clubs and associations.
- Amending Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2019/947 — UAS geographical zones and national conditions – to add paragraph 1bis requiring Member States, before establishing a UAS geographical zone or a national condition, to ensure that the measures concerned are necessary and proportionate to the risk or objective to be addressed. In addition, where appropriate, the entity proposing the establishment of the UAS geographical zone shall document the assessment underpinning those measures. This introduces an objective and verifiable basis for the exercise of Member State discretion under this provision, without imposing a specific risk-assessment methodology
- Amending Article 14(1) to explicitly require Member States to verify the identity of a UAS operator before completing that operator’s registration. This addresses a gap identified through standardisation inspections, which have shown differing interpretations and levels of implementation of the existing registration obligation across Member States. Such differences undermine the ability of competent authorities to identify UAS operators and take effective enforcement action, including in response to security threats. EASA will consider developing AMC to support a harmonised approach.
- Amending article 14(5) to base the registration requirement in the ‘open’ category on a single mass threshold of 100 g. This replaces the previous criteria based on a 250 g threshold or, irrespective of mass, the carriage of a sensor capable of capturing personal data, which also referred to the exemption for toys within the meaning of Directive 2009/48/EC7). UAS operators that operate exclusively tethered UAS with a take-off mass of up to 1 kg remain exempt from the registration requirement, reflecting both the inherently lower risk profile of such operations and the fact that EU competence extends only to tethered UA with a take-off mass exceeding 1 kg. In the ‘specific’ category, the requirement for all UAS operators to register, irrespective of mass, has been retained.
- Extending the requirement to be equipped with, and to operate, an active direct remote identification function to all UAS with a take-off mass of 100 g or more operated in the ‘open’ category (point UAS.OPEN.050(9)), and to all UAS operated in the ‘specific’ category at a height below 120 m above the surface, irrespective of mass (point UAS.SPEC.050(1)(l)(ii)). This is consistent with the corresponding registration requirements described above. A UAS with a take-off mass of less than 100 g is not required to be class-marked and, if operated in the ‘open’ category, is not required to comply with the direct remote identification requirement. However, all UAS that bear a CIL, irrespective of take-off mass, must be equipped with a direct remote identification function as required by the applicable parts of the Annex.
- Amending Article 16(5) to allow Member States to specify, in the authorisation issued under Article 16(1), whether UAS operated within that framework are to be equipped with a direct remote identification function.
- Amending delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 to ensure that UAS are designed and equipped in such a way as to meet the security requirements described above, in particular the extended direct remote identification requirement and the associated function preventing take-off in cases where the UAS operator registration number has not been uploaded to the system.
- Amending the rules around Privately built UAS. A number of commentators, including manufacturers of privately built UAS, questioned the extension of product legislation to functional capabilities integrated into UAS that are not placed on the market. EASA clarified that, in order to operate under a STS, UAS must bear a CIL under Union harmonisation legislation, including cases where they are privately built.
- Amending the rules around Mass tolerances. To address a comment requesting greater legal certainty regarding mass tolerance, Parts 1 to 5 of the Annex to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 are proposed to be amended to specify an explicit tolerance of 2 % or 3 %, depending on the class, between the actual mass of the UA in its possible con-figurations and its declared MTOM. For similar reasons, tolerances have been specified also for other parameters.
- Amending the rules around direct remote identification and take-off prevention. “Part 6 of the Annex to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 is proposed to be substantially revised to set out the requirements for a direct remote identification component and add-on. Some commentators proposed that the function preventing take-off in cases where the consistency check is not passed should be specified in Part 6 of the Annex to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945, while others considered that this function does not pertain to direct remote identification as such. EASA agrees with the latter view. Although the take-off prevention function relies on the outcome of the consistency check performed by the direct remote identification component or add-on, it is a function of the UAS itself. It is therefore specified in Parts 1 to 5 of the Annex, as applicable to the relevant UAS class, rather than in Part 6 of the Annex to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945.”
- Amending the rules around Tethered UAS In response to a comment on the rationale for the minimum tether strength required for tethered UAS, the applicable factor for heavier-than-air tethered UAS has been set at 4 times the thrust capability of the aircraft, rather than the factor of 10 initially proposed, which industry considered unachievable.
- Not amending the rules around critical infrastructure. EASA has decided not to introduce a standalone concept of ‘critical infrastructure’ into Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947. Instead, the protection of critical infrastructure and other sensitive sites from UAS operations will continue to be addressed through the general mechanism for establishing UAS geographical zones under Article 15.
- Not amending the rules around Geo-awareness NPA 2026-103 (C) ‘Proposed amendments to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947’ proposed extending the requirement for UAS to be equipped with a geo-awareness function (a function that automatically alerts the remote pilot when the UAS approaches a UAS geographical zone). This included the introduction of a new geo-awareness module proposed for Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945. A significant number of national aviation authorities, model aircraft associations, UAS manufacturers and other industry stakeholders opposed the proposal. In light of these comments and considering the benefits that the geo-awareness service will provide for operations conducted in U-space airspace, EASA has decided not to pursue the proposed extension of the geo-awareness requirement in this Opinion. Consequently, the corresponding amendments to points UAS.OPEN.050 and UAS.SPEC.050(1)(k), as proposed in NPA 2026-103 (C), have therefore not been carried forward.
- Clarifying tasks of the competent authority It is proposed to add point (n) to Article 18 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 to clarify that the tasks of the competent authority include issuing, amending, suspending or revoking UAS operator registrations.
- Replacing Article 20 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 . In addition to retaining the existing conditions applicable to certain legacy UAS operated in the ‘open’ category, the revised Article would establish new transitional arrangements for UAS placed on the market before [12 months after the date of entry into force of this Regulation]. All such UAS would be exempt from the requirement to incorporate a function preventing take-off when the UAS operator registration number has not been uploaded to the system, as compliance would require a major modification of the UAS. UAS with a take-off mass of 900 g or less would also be exempt from the requirement to be equipped with a direct remote identification add-on as installing such an add-on has been assessed as technically unfeasible for very light UAS.
(Image: Ivan Vasylyev / Shutterstock.com)
For more information
Opinion No 06/2026 – Regular update of Regulations (EU) 2019/947 and (EU) 2019/945 — Security | EASA