A new white paper from the Center for Internet Security examines the public safety and security implications of the United States’ Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) proposed Part 108 framework and the supporting uncrewed traffic management (UTM) ecosystem.
The FAA estimates that more than 400,000 commercial and other non-recreational drones are currently active in the United States, with the fleet expected to grow in the coming years. The paper considers how public safety agencies may need to adapt as authorised beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) operations become more routine. It examines evolving assumptions about operator location, the growing importance of integrating Remote ID and UTM data with other detection capabilities, the challenge of distinguishing legitimate drone activity from potentially malicious operations, and the need for resilient information sharing and coordination processes.
“Ground teams responding to a detected drone near a venue will no longer be able to assume that finding the operator is a viable near-term option,” the paper states. “This represents more than a procedural change; it alters a foundational assumption underlying many public safety counter-UAS response models. Existing protocols to identify, locate and engage an operator will need to evolve for an environment where drone operations may be remote, automated or managed through distributed systems.”
Instead of primarily relying on visual observation or locating nearby operators, the paper notes that agencies will need to integrate information from multiple sources, including Remote ID, UTM services, flight intent information, aircraft identification and other operational data, to understand activity occurring within the low-altitude airspace.
“For event security and public safety operations, no single source of information should be viewed as a definitive indicator of whether a drone is authorized or threatening,” the paper continues. “A drone without an available Remote ID signal could represent a technical failure, a non-compliant operator, or a deliberate attempt to avoid detection. Likewise, the presence of a Remote ID signal alone does not eliminate the need for operational assessment.”
The paper’s authors say that UTM data should complement rather than replace other airspace awareness and response capabilities. “UTM services depend on communications networks, digital infrastructure, and the timely exchange of operational data. Technical disruptions, network outages, degraded communications or temporary data availability issues could affect visibility into authorised UAS operations and complicate public safety decision-making during time-sensitive incidents.”
The paper adds that future public safety preparedness efforts utilising drones should address not only how information from multiple sources will be integrated, validated and shared with public safety decision-makers, but also how those processes will be exercised and sustained during time-sensitive operations.
Practical recommendations are included to help law enforcement, emergency management and event security leaders prepare for a more connected airspace. They highlight strategies for strengthening airspace awareness, integrating emerging UTM capabilities into operational workflows, and improving coordination and response across agencies to help organisations operate safely and confidently in an increasingly connected airspace.
For more information
Paper: Preparing Public Safety for a More Connected Airspace
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