By Philip Butterworth-Hayes
How would the US army manage today against an enemy which deploys swarm attacks of AI-enabled fast, low-observable drones operating in a closely coordinated manner – with the lead drone flying above the battlefield to coordinate multi-directional deadly and decoy strikes, all linked by a communications network which cannot be hacked, spoofed or jammed?
It is a truth, universally acknowledged, that the drone war in Ukraine is defining the size, shape and technical priorities for the global counter-UAS industry, at least in the military domain. As new drone challenges appear on the battlefield at least once a month – with the first elements of the scenario above already in place – military planners around the world are racing to identify and deploy systems which are technically capable, affordable and scalable enough to meet these evolving challenges.
In September 2025 the general direction of travel for the industry is becoming clear. In terms of technology, RF detectors and mitigation measures are daily becoming less useful on the battlefield as both Russia and Ukraine deploy AI-based and fibre-optic cable systems which are not vulnerable to RF interference. Strategically (in defence of cities and vital infrastructure) C-UAS networks are required to defend against waves of drones, loitering munitions and ballistic missiles. These need to be not just effective but sustainable. According to Ukraine’s United24 media, 15,933 Shaheds were launched against Ukraine in June, July and August this year.
The core technology to do this is available in the form layered defences, where a range of sensors (radar, acoustic, cameras) are integrated with a range of mitigation measures (guns, missiles, intercept drones, net-capture drones, electronic counter-measures). But these are expensive, static and very hard to fully integrate. Just over the horizon the prospect of 100kW AI-enabled laser systems, which have the power and speed to autonomously destroy individual drones at the rate of less than two seconds per engagement, offer a step-change in the ability of cities to defend themselves.
On the frontline, where ubiquitous drone attacks have the 15km behind the front line a dead zone for crewed logistics vehicles, more affordable and agile C-UAS systems are urgently needed, with assault-rifle-based small drone targeting systems or low-cost interceptors required as a last-ditch defences alongside passive sensor systems which can provide early warning alerts.
In parallel, new unforeseen threats suddenly appear, such as Ukraine’s “Spider’s Web” operation in June 2025 which used Russia’s mobile telephone networks to coordinate an attack of 117 explosive drones against Russian nuclear-capable bombers across five regions.
The non-military C-UAS markets are also facing shifting challenges. As with the military, the drone threat is escalating with criminals, the careless and very, very occasionally terrorists increasing their presence in and around sensitive civilian and government buildings, including airports, prisons and power stations. Here, RF detectors and effectors are far more useful as 99% of the drone threats come from commercially available drones or homebuilt drones which reply on commercially available components.
“All drone incidents are local incidents first,” said Dr. Ryan Wallace, Professor of Aeronautical Science, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, speaking at the United States House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Crime and Government Surveillance on September 16, 2025. “Often, the first response to these incidents will be sworn officers from one of the nation’s 17,541 state and local law enforcement agencies …. Most of these agencies lack formal training for dealing with drone incidents, and even fewer are equipped with tools to support the detection, tracking, and identification of UAS.” In the civil world often the detectors of rogue drone incursions are unlikely to have the authority to mitigate the problem. But with beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) drones and eVTOLs about to enter the low-level airspace in vast numbers across North America, the Middle East and Europe, there is a growing imperative for security agencies to field systems which spot the rogue drone among swarm of medical and pizza delivery drones – and deal with it.
These operational drivers are creating high levels of churn in the supply chain.
For industry, the ultimate goal is to be able to sell and support a complete integrated system of networked detectors and mitigation measures woven together in a command-and-control system which can autonomously classify the threat and act on it. Most companies will be happy just to be part of the team. But to deal with the coming AI swarm-attack threat on the battlefield and the towns and cities behind, new layered C-UAS networks will be required, with new mitigation and detector systems incorporated into autonomous networks which can automatically respond to these attacks.
Very few companies in the world have the expertise to provide this capability. The large-scale integrators (BAE Systems, Boeing, Leidos, Lockheed-Martin, Safran) have in the main been kept busy with huge amounts of government funding to develop strategic new technologies to defend existing ground and naval platforms. In the last few years around USD2 billion has been invested via organisations such as the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the US Army’s (Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office) in directed energy weapons, with most money going into naval programmes. When required, they have bought up niche suppliers to gain access to key technologies – but these are not agile companies.
By and large, these big companies are excellent at deploying legacy command and control systems and integrated air defences but rubbish at meeting an urgent operational request for some of the key C-UAS affordable battlefield technologies which everyone wants now, such as low-cost intercept drones and missiles and low-cost battlefield passive detectors. Niche suppliers of these are in a happy place.
In the last two years it is the companies in the middle of the supply chain who have been the real winners. These are small enough to respond in an agile fashion to urgent operational requirements but big enough to gain new niche capabilities through acquisition or partnerships. And in the vital corporate process of acquiring niche capabilities acquisition is much more valuable than partnership. The owner owns the IP. Investment, profit-share and marketing responsibilities are far more easily managed from a single company headquarters.
These companies are now leading the industry not just in pioneering new technologies but also in offering more flexible, future-proof acquisition models for end-users. The companies that have been successful in this area – including Anduril, Dedrone , DroneShield, D-Fend, Dyzne, EOS, MyDefence, OSL – have been able to navigate the initial “fake it till you make it” stages of the C-UAS industry and develop complex technical capabilities organically, to the extent that many of these pioneers are in a far more capable place of developing and supporting complex layered C-UAS defence systems than the legacy major integrators.
For the unfortunate fact is the Ukraine war has separated the wheat from the chaff in terms of a C-UAS company being able to prove its operational performance matches its marketing spiel.
Even governments have now recognised that the lessons of Ukraine – small, fast, effective, entrepreneurial, affordable C-UAS – need to be transferred asap into the C-UAS supply chain. It was something of a landmark moment when the UK Secretary of State for Defence John Healey speaking at DSEI UK 2025 in London in September, announced Project Octopus. In this, the UK will mass produce a new C-UAS capability which centred on Ukrainian engineers using “a piece of drainpipe” to build a system that costs less than 10% of the systems it is targeting. “Through Project Octopus, with this drone, our Ukrainian friends will share the technology and intellectual property with the UK. In turn, together, we’ll rapidly develop this further and then mass-produce it, supplying thousands of interceptor drones back into Ukraine each month,” Healey explained. “For Ukraine, this means they can better protect their people, their homeland…for Britain, it means we have access to the best and developing battlefield technology for our own forces.”
This is just one of several examples of European governments forging links with Ukraine’s C-UAS industry – and some of these capabilities will be required security forces as well as the military, as AI-enabled attack drones from Ukraine find their way into arsenals of drug cartels and terrorists.
As new types of threats evolve, new types of companies are emerging which can respond far more quickly and flexibly to the technology and affordability C-UAS challenges than ever before.
This article is taken from the forward of the Unmanned Airspace 2025 global counter UAS industry directory – available from September 25.
https://www.unmannedairspace.info/counter-uas-industry-directory/
(Image Shutterstock)
